The only way to guarantee no student dies is to prevent the shooting.   These prevention strategies include onsite law enforcement, physical security and threat assessment programs.  These programs are effective, but no prevention strategy or combination of prevention strategies can (or should) promise total protection.

When a gunman enters a school, and places the killing of others over his own survival, it is likely that people will be severely injured and/or killed.   Intruder response plans and training that can greatly mitigate the shooters ability to kill.  But once the first shot is fired, the response is about mitigation – not prevention.

The program referenced in this article  (ALiCE) instructs students to “counter” or fight back against a shooter.   I do not agree with teaching high school students to fight back against a shooter (and am vehemently opposed to the idea of teaching this to middle and elementary students) but have no problem teaching them to run (get Out) if they are in an unsecured area near the shooter.  I am of the mindset that most programs that “train” kids to fight back offer a TSA-like over-reaction to a very serious problem.

There is no such thing a perfect technique or tactic.  A shooting is too dynamic, with too many variables, no  tactic will work 100% of the time.   Intruder response plans and training are designed to mitigate the success of a shooter when prevention efforts fail.  There is a big difference between mitigation and prevention.

This post is provided by SafePlans (www.safeplans.com), a provider of all-hazards preparedness solutions including emergency plans, security assessments, staff training, and detailed site mapping.

This is not to diminish the importance of programs like threat assessment or the advances in physical security.  Unfortunately no amount of physical security can stop every external attack and even the most robust threat assessment programs can fail to identify potentially violent behavior in time to stop all attacks stemming from students or employees.  Therefore, it is vital that campuses implement intruder response plans and training to mitigate the impact of a violent intruder and maximize survivability for occupants.   This requires more than a simple lockdown.

The primary objective of any security measure should be to mitigate risk.  A second, less critical objective, may be to reduce anxiety.  Lockdown plans and drills are great at reducing anxiety.  Unfortunately, they do very little to mitigate risks from an active shooter/mass killer.   A lockdown drill helps campuses respond extremely well under reasonable conditions.  To effectively mitigate an actives shooter, campuses must prepare to do reasonably well under extreme conditions.

Passive Targets=Easy Victims

When law enforcement officers counter a shooting incident, the hit ratio is around
12 to18 percent.  School shooter’s hit ratios are dramatically higher, with some as high as 80 percent.  The difference is not attributed to shooting skill, but rather the passive response.

• In mass killings, the available targets are predictable and stationary.
• In police shootings, police are in fear for their lives and the suspect is not passive.
• In a school shooting the shooter does not have pressure or fear and victims are passive

When security and prevention measures fail and a shooter is in your school; you have only three response options or what’s known as the “3 outs.”

1. Lock Out or Keep the shooter out of your room or facility
2. Get Out - Run away from the shooter
3. Take Out - Fight back against the shooter

Lock Out

While no location can offer total protection from a shooter, implementing a “lockdown” inside a securable location provides some degree of protection. The purpose of a lockdown is to delay or slow down the shooters progress until law enforcement arrives.

While locking the door is a vital component, there are methods of reinforcing the lockdown that can further deter an attacker. These methods are called target hardening and can include:

• Barricading doors: use desks, chairs, shelves, etc. Note, barricades are most effective if the door opens towards the barricade. However, even if the door opens away from the barricade (usually into the hallway), stacked objects can delay and possibly deter an attacker.
• Tying off doors: This action limit the attackers ability to open doors; even if they are unlocked. Generally, tying off doors is used to reinforce doors that open out (towards the hallway) where barricades have limited value. There several methods ways to tie off doors and more than one should be attempted:
1. Tie one end of a belt or electric cord around the handle and secure the other end around a corner and out of site. If the end cannot be secured, have several people hold it, while around a corner and out of site. This will reinforce any type of door.
2. For handicap accessible handles (levers that are pushed downward to open the door), chair or stool legs may be wedged between the handle and door, with at least 1/4 of the chair extending beyond the doorframe. When the door is pulled to open, the chair catches on the door frame.
3. Doors that have folding hinges above the door may be reinforced by tying the folding hinge tightly so that it cannot expand and allow the door to open.

Get Out

If you cannot lock the shooter out of your location, attempt to help students Get Out of the area by running away.

An example of when to implement a “Get Out” approach may be if you are in the cafeteria when a shooter enters. Since the shooter is already in the cafeteria there is no point in attempting to implement a “Lock Out”; so you order the students to run out through the kitchen and side exit.

Note: Using the 3 Out approach, the Get Out approach should be implemented using a secondary exit (ground floor windows or exits) if the attacker attempts to defeat the lockdown. If Get Out is not an option, the Take Out or fight back approach should be implemented as soon as the attacker attempts entry. This includes reaching through a defeated vision panel.

Take Out

If the attacker is in your immediate area and blocking your path and there is no way you can Lock Out or Get Out; You must then fight back and Take Out the shooter using any available means.

When fighting back, use any available weapon such as a fire extinguisher, chair or even books.

The Take Out option is to be used as a last resort.

Teaching or discussing with students the Take Out option is not recommended. The Take Out option is no different than any other emergency, staff and faculty must take charge and provide clear direction.

For instance, if the Lock Out option is failing, and Get Out is required through a ground floor window, it is imperative the teacher direct students. This direction should include not just to  climb out the window, but where to go next.

If the Take Out option is required, the teacher should prepare the students with clear and confident instructions. Should an attacker be attempting to defeat a lockdown and Get Out is not possible the teacher should order students to grab books and chairs and to throw anything and everything they can find at the attacker should he attempt to enter the area.

Whether it is a campus shooting or an act of terrorism, attacks from violent intruders are as much of a fact of life as building fires and natural disasters. To prepare for this threat, leaders are faced with the following decision-making possibilities:

• Do nothing and hope nothing happens.
• Do nothing and it does happen.
• Do something and nothing happens.
• Do something and it happens.

This post is provided by Brad Spicer, CEO of SafePlans (www.safeplans.com), an all-hazards preparedness solution including emergency plans, staff training, and detailed site mapping.

The first of its kind “Intruder Vulnerability Assessment” app is a component of SafePlans’ Emergency Response Information Portal (ERIP) cloud homeland security solution and integrates with SafePlans’ Intruderology training program.

Click the icon to view in the App Store

Types of Schools Elementary Schools Middle Schools High Schools Private or Parochial Schools Public or Charter Schools Assessment Categories Onsite Law Enforcement or Security Access Control Proximity to Resources/Partnership with Law Enforcement Intruder Response Plan & Training Securable Classrooms Threat Assessment Program Visitor Management & Arrival/Dismissal Monitoring Current Site Security Assessment Communications Video Surveillance SafePlans delivers a complete emergency preparedness solution: Safety and security programs Facility-specific security and emergency preparedness plans Site security, risk, and vulnerability assessments Tactical Site Mapping Seminars, drills and table-top, functional and full-scale exercises On-demand on-line training courses For more information please visit SafePlans

Below is a summary of key items (Chapter 10 is available for download here).  SafePlans’ Emergency Response Information Portal (ERIP) contains web-based emergency plans and site mapping capabilities to help PA districts to easily comply with the following items.  Please contact SafePlans if we can be of assistance or to request a demo of the ERIP system (866-210-SAFE or info@safeplans.com).

§ 10.2. Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to establish and maintain a cooperative relationship between school entities and local police departments in the reporting and resolution of incidents that occur on school property, at any school sponsored activity, or on a conveyance as described in the Safe Schools Act (such as a school bus) providing transportation to or from a school or school sponsored activity.

 From Section 10.8 Emergency and nonemergency response preparedness

a)    Each school district, in cooperation with the local emergency management agency and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, annually shall develop and implement a comprehensive disaster response and emergency preparedness plan, as required by 35 Pa.C.S. § 7701(g) (relating to plans).

b)    A school district’s comprehensive disaster response and emergency preparedness plan shall be consistent with the guidelines developed by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and other applicable state requirements, as required by 35 Pa.C.S. § 7701(g).

c)     A school district shall provide the emergency management agency of every county of which the school district is a part a copy of the district’s comprehensive disaster response and emergency preparedness plan, as required by 35 Pa.C.S. § 7701(g).

d)    In developing a comprehensive disaster response and emergency preparedness plan, a school district shall consider the framework presented in the National Incident Management System.

e)     A school district shall provide to each local police department and each local fire department having jurisdiction over geographic territory of which the school district is a part a copy of the district’s comprehensive disaster and response emergency preparedness plan.

f)     In an emergency, a school district shall follow the procedures outlined in its comprehensive disaster response and emergency preparedness plan, adopted pursuant to 35 Pa.

 C.S. § 7701(g).

(g) School entities shall furnish the following information to local police departments and local fire departments annually, no later than September 30, to assist local police and fire departments in responding to an emergency:

(1) Blueprints or floor plans of the school buildings.

(2) Aerial photo, map or layout of the school campus, adjacent properties and surrounding streets or roads.

(3) posts. Locations of predetermined or prospective command

(4) Current teacher/employee roster.

(5) Current student roster.

(6) Current school yearbook.

(7) School fire-alarm shutoff location and procedures.

(8) School sprinkler system shutoff location and procedures.

(9)   Gas/utility line layouts and shutoff valve locations.

(10) Cable/satellite television shutoff location and procedures.

(11) Other information the school entity deems pertinent to assist local police departments in responding to an emergency.

“The book’s main point is simple: no matter how expert you may be, well-designed check lists can improve outcomes” – freakonomics

Emergency plans come in a variety of formats, names and even purposes.   For the most part, it seems emergency management has gone away from integrating checklists.   Prior to the 2001 and the subsequent National Response Plan (NRP), National Incident Management System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS) and other federal requirements, checklists were not uncommon in emergency plans.

This is not to suggest that a checklist alone constitutes an emergency plan.  But after reading Gawande’s Checklist Manifesto, I am convinced they serve a much-needed role in emergency response and management.  The more complicated the emergency, the more critical the need.

Gawande points out that in a complex situation, experts are confronted by two difficulties.  1) The fallibility of human memory and attention (especially when dealing the mundane/routine matters that are easily put aside by more pressing concerns).   2) Complacency- people can intentionally skip, even when they remember them.  In a major emergency, after all, certain procedures don’t always matter.

Checklists help to provide protection against such failures and ensure the plan is properly implemented; or at least considered.

If you are interested in learning how to integrate checklists into your life, or just your emergency plans, I highly recommend you read “The Checklist Manifesto.”   If you are interested in upgrading your emergency plans into an intuitive cloud system, that automatically creates mobile apps (with checklist !), please contact SafePlans.com

Stay safe!
Brad

This post is provided by SafePlans (www.safeplans.com), an all-hazards preparedness solution including emergency plans, staff training, and detailed site mapping.

In the way of preparedness here are some recommended steps that go beyond the standard severe weahter shelter plans:
Pre-Planning
• Work with local emergency management officials to determine severe weather shelter areas
• Consider Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training for select staff
• Conduct drills to test communications (to include mass notificaiton) and movement to shelter assignments
• Preplan evacuation routes and rally points (avoiding power lines) in the event the school becomes damages and unsafe

When Severe Weather is a Possibility:• Assign staff to monitor weather
• Ensure radios (two-way/walkie-talkies and weather radios) are charged and conduct a staff meeting to review plans
• Consider special events, outdoor activities and bus times
When a Severe Weather Watch Occurs:
• Establish an interior command post
• Ask teachers to review severe weather plans
• Increase staff monitoring during transition times and meal periods
• Compare estimated storm impact with release times. Make plans to hold students and communicate with parents.
When a Severe Weather Warning Occurs:•
Enact severe weather plans

Always collaborate with your local response agencies on emergency planning issues.

Stay safe!
Brad

This post is provided by SafePlans (www.safeplans.com), an all-hazards preparedness solution including emergency plans, staff training, and detailed site mapping.

Click here to learn more about the author

Situational Awareness & Analysis

When attempting to predict the probability of attacks or identify potential targets, it helps to understand the terrorists’ thought processes and tactics.  Suleiman Abu Gheith, Al-Qaeda’s spokesman, said: “Al-Qaeda has the right to kill four million Americans, two million of them children.”
He also said, “Allah willing, the blow will come from where they least expect it…”

As previous attacks illustrate, terrorists will murder children as well as adults in order to gain maximum notoriety for their attacks.  To that end, an elementary school would be an obvious target.  Young children would be easier to control while their deaths would have a significant symbolic impact, or shock value, on the American Public.

Target Selection: Risk versus Reward

A simple criticality assessment will help to assign a potential target’s “value”  or “reward” in the eyes of would be attackers.

A target hardening assessment is used to analyze the risk involved with carrying out an attack.

Target selection analyzes the potential target’s value versus the security related risks.

So are schools an “attractive” target for terrorist?  A simple risk/reward analysis certainly illustrates the topic is worthy of discussion.

This post is provided by Brad Spicer, CEO of SafePlans (www.safeplans.com), an all-hazards preparedness solution including emergency plans, staff training, and detailed site mapping.

Click here to learn more about the author

The recent bomb threat plot in Utah illustrates the need for schools to be aware of threats from Improvised Explosive Devices (I.E.D.’s) and well as diversionary style attacks.  The SafePlans video from circa 2004 illustrates the risk of Secondary Attacks and their countermeasures.

Stay safe
Brad

This post is provided by SafePlans (www.safeplans.com), an all-hazards preparedness solution including emergency plans, staff training, and detailed site mapping.

Looks like Kinkel is no longer enjoying incarceration and would like to be moved to a mental hospital.  His lawyer is saying Kinkel landed in prison because he had inadequate legal representation.  The lawyer claims (among other things) that Kinkel being curled up in the fetal position days before he took the plea deal is indicative of mental illness.   He isn’t saying Kinkel curled in the fetal position days before murdering his parents, another student and wounding 25 .  No, after the killing and when he realized the rest of life would be behind bars, Kinkel felt bad.   I will save my sympathy for the victims of the shooting and hope Kinkel is kept in prison.

More on Kinkel’s Shooting:

http://www.schoolsafetynews.com/index.php/2010/02/fighting-back-…school-shooter/

For more on the transfer request:

http://news.opb.org/article/kinkel-wants-be-moved-prison-hospital/

This post is provided by Brad Spicer, CEO of SafePlans (www.safeplans.com).  SafePlans specializes in providing the technology, resources and training needed to improve emergency readiness and protect people and property.

Click here to learn more about the author

Regulating access is a fundamental pillar of security, yet because county clerks do not want to take the time to identify polling places that are not full of children, schools become a softer and higher profile target in a single action.

A softer target because the general public is invited unregulated into the school, while school is in session. Certainly election officials were will closely regulate voting activity, but hundreds and possibly thousands of adults will enter these polling schools without being challenged.

A higher profile target because a constitutionally protected action is taking place in the school, while school is in session. You may recall that just before the 2004 general election, Homeland Security announced that polling places were a potential terrorist attack.

For the election officials, schools ought not to be an attractive location either. Imagine a bomb threat being called into the school that has nothing to do with the polling place. Very few county or state election officials have plans in place to deal with the closing of a polling place for such an occurrence. If you don’t think bomb threats are a common occurrence in our schools, please check out http://schoolsafetynews.com/map and view bomb/IED related incidents for the past 12 months.

It may not be too late to ask election officials to locate alternate polling places. To do this, I would encourage a joint effort with local law enforcement. If local election officials refuse to locate alternate polling places, district administrators do have a few options:

1. 1. Schedule staff training days or close schools on Election Day. It may be a good idea to let parents know that this is in response to the unwillingness of the elected official to locate alternate polling places. Elected officials probably do not want parents to be unhappy.
2. 2. Since you can’t restrict access to the polling place, restrict access to the school from the polling place. Place the polling area in a location that has a separate entrance and can be sealed off from the students. Generally this means no physical education for the day or box lunches are served outside of the cafeteria. If this is not feasible, assign staff to monitor visitor ingress/egress and movement within the school.

I realize neither of these options is easy, but remember security is never convenient.

This post is provided by SafePlans (www.safeplans.com), an all-hazards preparedness solution including emergency plans, staff training, and detailed site mapping.

Click here to learn more about the author